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Transparency and Public Reporting Are 
Essential for a Safe Health Care System
What will it take to motivate hospitals to do what we know works to make health 
care safer? Of the three major approaches to improving patient safety—regulation/
accreditation, financial incentives, and public reporting—the most promising is 
public reporting of performance information and feedback to providers. Transparency 
is an idea whose time has come and both hospitals and the public will be better off 
because of it.
Data from a large number of hospitals, gathered by several sources, show wide 
variations in the incidence of one of the most lethal hospital-acquired complica-
tions, central line–associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs). Compared with 
the evidence on how to prevent other types of infections—and most other kinds 
of adverse events—the evidence on how to prevent CLABSIs is quite strong. 
Peter Pronovost demonstrated the potential for complete elimination of central 
line infections in his intensive care unit at Johns Hopkins Hospital seven years 
ago.1 In 2005, in a stunning display of generalizability, Pronovost and his team 
taught staff in over 100 Michigan hospitals to implement his protocol for central 
line insertion, and 68 hospitals completely eliminated CLABSIs for six months 
or more.2 
Yet, we still have significant rates of CLABSI in most hospitals, and 
some are very high. What is going on? What is going on is that the vast majority 
of hospitals have not implemented the Pronovost protocol because they have not 
made a meaningful commitment to reducing preventable injuries, much less 
eliminating them. Despite an avalanche of data, exhortation from all kinds of 
experts, and impressive results by some, most hospitals have in place programs 
to implement only a few of the known safe practices, and none has a strategic 
plan to implement all of the 34 evidence-based safe practices endorsed by the 
National Quality Forum. The “chasm” between what we know and what we actu-
ally do to prevent complications of our treatment matches that described for all 
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of quality by the Institute of Medicine in its 2001 
report, Crossing the Quality Chasm.3
What will it take to motivate hospitals to do 
what we know works to make health care safer? 
Evidence is available on the effectiveness of three 
major approaches: regulation/accreditation, financial 
incentives, and public reporting of performance and 
feedback to providers.  
Regulation and accReditation
Because regulation is a state function, and there is tre-
mendous variation in state approaches to quality and 
safety, its use has been spotty. Information from 
reporting systems, for example, is seldom used by reg-
ulators to improve safety. Although licensing functions 
are usually supported with public funds, state depart-
ments of public health seldom have the resources to 
monitor hospital practices. Given cost constraints and 
inertia, this situation seems unlikely to change in the 
near future. The leading accreditor, the Joint 
Commission, has been the most effective force for 
change by requiring hospitals to implement its Patient 
Safety Goals. However, monitoring safe practices is 
only a small part of the Joint Commission’s activities. 
It seems unlikely that either it or the states will be able 
to exert enough pressure to get health care systems to 
make the quantum changes necessary in hundreds of 
processes to make health care safe.
Financial incentives
Using the reimbursement system to improve quality  
of care has been in vogue for a decade or more. 
Incentives are usually positive: payment of a bonus  
as a percentage of reimbursement—2 percent in the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)/
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration—
although rewards are sometimes packaged with penal-
ties for underperformers. Rewards tend to be for pro-
cess improvement, not outcomes. There is some evi-
dence that financial incentives improve compliance 
with quality indicators (such as use of certain 
medications following acute myocardial infarction), 
but little or no evidence of improved outcomes.4 
Programs tend to reward mostly providers who are 
already leaders in quality. As with standards to improve 
public education, many fear that providers will perform 
to the test rather than proactively seek to improve qual-
ity, but this is a concern with all measurement.
Financial incentives for improving safety, on 
the other hand, are relatively new. In contrast to those 
for improving quality, which are positive and process-
oriented, incentives for safety have been negative and 
outcome-oriented: instead of receiving a bonus for 
adhering to a safe practice, providers are penalized for 
the consequences of not doing so. The focus has been 
on selected “never events,” taken from the list of seri-
ous reportable events developed by the National 
Quality Forum.5 These are significant patient harms 
that hospitals know how to prevent—or should know. 
Such financial disincentives began in Minnesota but 
have been given national reach with CMS’ recent deci-
sion not to reimburse hospitals for the additional costs 
attributable to eight serious reportable events. 
Although the stakes for any hospital are small 
(these are, or should be, rare events), the pushback has 
been considerable. Hospitals claim, with some justifi-
cation, that not all of these events are preventable. 
This concern seems particularly apt for at least two of 
the “no-pay” events on the CMS list: falls and urinary 
catheter–associated infections.6 Reliable and valid 
practices for preventing these adverse events have yet 
to be developed. 
Evidence that not paying for serious reportable 
events improves safety also is lacking. The experience 
in Minnesota is not encouraging. For example, the 
number of wrong-site surgeries and retention of 
foreign bodies in Minnesota hospitals actually 
increased substantially from 2006 to 2009.7 Some of 
this increase is undoubtedly related to improved 
compliance with the reporting requirement, but 
nonetheless it does not indicate that the penalty is 
having a positive effect.
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RepoRting and Feedback
So far, the most powerful method for reducing pre-
ventable injuries has been to require physicians to pro-
vide data on their own performance and then provide 
them with comparisons of their risk-adjusted compli-
cation rates with those of their peers. The Veterans 
Administration (VA) pioneered this approach in the 
1990s with its National Surgical Quality Improvement 
Program, which has since been adopted and promoted 
by the American College of Surgeons. Under this pro-
gram, each hospital’s surgical specialty department 
receives feedback on its risk-adjusted complication 
and mortality rates, together with a comparison with 
all of the other (unidentified) surgical departments in 
the VA system. In response to these reports, below-
average units made substantial improvements, leading 
over several years to systemwide declines in both 
complication rates and mortality that significantly 
exceeded the secular trend.8
It is reasonable to assume, though as yet 
unproved, that public reporting of similar types of data 
would spur hospitals to make greater efforts to reduce 
adverse events. Hospitals—or the public—can choose 
the benchmark level they prefer: above average, top 
decile, or others. But it seems evident that perfor-
mance reporting works best when all providers partici-
pate—as in the VA experience. Thus, reporting has to 
be mandatory. As Wachter emphasizes, it is essential 
that the events to be reported are a) clinically signifi-
cant, b) easily measured, and c) largely if not com-
pletely preventable.9 Risk adjustment is essential for 
fair comparisons. 
The “benchmark” in safety, of course, should 
be zero. If it is, then risk adjustment is irrelevant. The 
hope is that, as it becomes public knowledge that some 
hospitals are able to eliminate certain types of adverse 
events, others will be motivated to follow. While a 
major thrust of the patient safety movement has been 
to eliminate blaming and shaming of individuals when 
they make mistakes, for organizations public reporting 
may be an appropriate use of shaming.
The larger issue here is transparency. From an 
ethical standpoint, the argument in favor of 
transparency is straightforward: the public has a vital 
stake in the outcomes of health care, and therefore it 
has a right to know how we are doing. (The contrary 
argument that hospitals and doctors have a right to 
keep their results secret in order to protect those with 
bad results is patently untenable.)
From an economic standpoint, Porter and oth-
ers regard consumer access to full information as a 
critical element of value-driven purchasing of health 
care.10 They contend that consumers can make mean-
ingful choices only if they have complete information. 
While this formulation is attractive to some econo-
mists and policymakers, repeated studies over more 
than 20 years—going back to the Pennsylvania cardiac 
surgical scorecards of the 1980s—show that few 
patients and even fewer doctors pay much attention to 
this type of information in deciding with whom and 
where they will receive their medical care. 
From the standpoint of improving patient 
safety, however, transparency is crucial. It is the cor-
nerstone of the cultural transformation that our health 
care organizations need to undergo to become safe. 
Transparency is essential within an institution if care-
givers are to feel safe in reporting and talking about 
their mistakes. The free flow of information is essen-
tial for identifying and correcting the underlying sys-
tems failures. Transparency is also the key to success-
ful—and ethical—responses to patients when things go 
wrong. It is the cover-ups that lead to lawsuits. And 
transparency is essential for accountability, to show 
the public that the hospital or system responds ethi-
cally to its failures. Internal transparency begets exter-
nal transparency—and vice-versa. 
Although most hospitals are still skeptical 
about being transparent, evidence from a few organiza-
tions that have gone public with their bad news shows 
that it is a win-win situation. First, transparency moti-
vates caregivers to improve care. Lives are saved. In 
addition, openness shows that the hospital feels 
accountable and has nothing to hide, which increases 
public confidence. Transparency is an idea whose time 
has come and both hospitals and the public will be bet-
ter off because of it.
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